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NOTE

From: General Secretariat of the Council
To: Permanent Representatives Committee
Subject: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938
- Analysis of the final compromise text with a view to agreement

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 17 June 2025, the Commission submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council a proposal for a Regulation on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending the Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This proposal aims to decisively phase out the remaining pipeline gas and LNG imports from Russia. It is a key deliverable of the Commission Communication entitled 'Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports'¹. This roadmap outlines a strategy to phase out the remaining energy imports from Russia in relation to gas, oil and nuclear. It was presented on 15 May 2025, as a follow up to the March 2022 Versailles Declaration, in which the leaders agreed to phase-out dependency on Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible.

¹ 8686/1/25 REV1

2. Following intense preparatory work, the Council reached a General Approach on the proposal on 20 October 2025 and gave a mandate to the Presidency to start negotiations with the European Parliament.
3. In the European Parliament, Mr Ville NIINISTÖ (Greens/EFA, FI) has been appointed as rapporteur for the proposal on behalf of the ITRE Committee and Ms Inese VAIDERE (EPP, LV) as rapporteur for the proposal on behalf of the INTA Committee. The joint ITRE-INTA Committee vote took place on 16 October 2025 and the announcement in plenary on 20 October 2025.
4. The European Economic and Social Committee delivered its opinion on 17 September 2025. The Committee of the Regions was consulted.
5. An exchange of letters took place on 22 October 2025 to kick off the interinstitutional negotiations. Fifteen interinstitutional technical meetings took place to prepare the trilogues at technical level.
6. Three trilogues were held on 6 November 2025, 20 November and 2 December. At the third trilogue, a provisional agreement was reached between the co-legislators, resulting in the final compromise text as set out in the Annex to this note.

II. MAIN ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE

8. On the key political issues, the compromise agreed provisionally with the Parliament consists of the following elements:
 - a) Phase-out dates for LNG and pipelines with corresponding transition periods

The compromise text stipulates that imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG will be prohibited six weeks after the Regulation comes into force, while allowing a transition period for existing contracts. The co-legislators agreed to align the phase-out date for Russian LNG imports with the timeline established in the 19th sanctions package, namely: 25 April 2026 for short-term supply contracts and 1 January 2027 for long-term supply contracts.

Regarding the phase-out of Russian pipeline gas imports, the prohibition will take effect on 17 June 2026 for short-term supply contracts. For long-term pipeline gas contracts, the prohibition will be enforced on 30 September 2027, if Member States are on track to meet the storage filling targets set out in the Gas Storage Regulation. If that is not the case the prohibition will be enforced one month later from 1 November 2027.

Amendments to existing contracts will be permitted only for narrowly defined operational purposes and cannot lead to increased volumes, as specified in the General Approach text.

b) Prior authorisation

The provisions regarding prior authorisation retain all the key elements from the General Approach text, including: (i) the concept of the authorising authority (with discretion for Member States to designate authorities other than customs authorities); (ii) a five working-day deadline for submitting documents for non-Russian gas imports; and (iii) the criteria for exempting countries from prior authorisation.

At Parliament's request, the provision now allows the Commission to revoke exemptions if exporters from exempted countries are found to be circumventing the rules.

The compromise text also emphasizes the need for closer scrutiny in the enforcement of import where the risk of circumvention is high due to trade with Russian gas or production facilities partially owned by Russian companies.

The enforcement has also been strengthened by requiring the authorising authorities to share information on refusals of prior authorisation, and the possible role of OLAF in cases of fraud or circumvention is highlighted. Additionally, the Commission is required to issue guidance on prior authorisation and which types of documents and evidence importers must submit.

c) Suspension clause

One of the Parliament's key priorities was the deletion of the suspension clause. However, as part of the overall compromise, it has been retained and can be activated by the Commission if a Member State declares an emergency under the Security of Gas Supply Regulation. The suspension would be strictly limited to what is necessary to address the crisis and would only apply to the purchase of Russian gas via short-term supply contracts. It could last for a maximum of four weeks, with the possibility of renewal if the conditions for an emergency still apply. The Commission would be required to inform both Parliament and the Council about the suspension and its potential extension.

d) Penalties

The obligation for Member States to implement harmonised penalties with maximum amounts was another key issue for Parliament, necessary for a political agreement on the file. The compromise text now includes provisions for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with the Regulation, including a maximum threshold for penalties applicable to both companies and individuals. The Parliament accepted the architecture proposed by the Council that comprises the following range of options, which Member States would be allowed to choose from when implementing a penalty regime for legal entities:

- a maximum penalty of at least 3,5% of the undertaking's total worldwide annual turnover;
- or a fixed level of at least 40 million EUR;
- or 300% of the estimated transaction turnover.

For individuals the maximum penalty should not be lower than 2,5 million EUR.

Member States will be required to implement the necessary national provisions within two years of the entry into force of the Regulation.

e) Oil, including diversification plans for oil

The Parliament had included the prohibition of Russian oil imports in its negotiating mandate, but it was not incorporated into the text. Instead, more transparency has been included in the oil diversification plans, including an obligation on the Commission to issue recommendations on those plans. The obligation to produce such plans is maintained from the General Approach text, which applies only to Member States that receive oil from the Russian Federation. In addition, the Commission committed to make a statement whereby it would table a legislative proposal at the beginning of 2026 to ban oil imports from the Russian Federation as soon as possible, but no later than by the end of 2027.

f) National diversification plans for gas

The compromise text requires all Member States to submit national diversification plans outlining measures to diversify their gas supplies and address potential challenges. In order to provide a solid foundation for making the plans, the text requires companies to notify to the Commission and to the competent authorities concerned within four weeks of the Regulation's entry into force whether they have Russian gas supply contracts.

g) Other provisions

The Parliament accepted the General approach text as regards a range of more Member State-specific provisions. It also accepted to maintain the scope of the proposal. Finally, it upholds a majority of the definitions, the review clause, the regime for entry into force and application with the transition period of 6 weeks, and the provision clarifying the relationship with the 19th sanctions package.

III. CONCLUSION

9. The Permanent Representatives Committee is invited to:

- a) endorse the agreement on the final compromise text as set out in the Annex to this note, in view of reaching an agreement at first reading with the European Parliament; and
- b) authorise the Presidency to inform the European Parliament that, should the European Parliament adopt its position at first reading, in accordance with Article 294, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, in the form set out in the text contained in the Annex to this note (subject to revision by the lawyer linguists of both institutions), the Council will, in accordance with Article 294, paragraph 4 of the Treaty, approve the European Parliament's position at first reading and the act shall be adopted in the wording which corresponds to the European Parliament's position.

REGULATION (EU) .../...
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

of

**on phasing out Russian natural gas *imports and*
preparing the phase out of oil imports,
improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and
amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938**

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 194(2) and 207 thereof,


Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee²,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions³,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure⁴,



² OJ C, ...

³ OJ C, ...

⁴ *Position of the European Parliament of ... (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of ...*

Whereas:

(1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas **for** markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of **State or Government** therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 [] and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 2022 [] proposed concrete measures to allow **for** the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process **of diversifying** gas supplies away from **the Russian Federation has been** achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, the Commission [] in its **REPowerEU** Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025 **announced** a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for **addressing** energy dependencies. **In order to ensure EU energy security and resilience, it is urgent and strategically needed to address all remaining energy dependencies mentioned in the RepowerEU roadmap.**

(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, *as well as* the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, *demonstrate* that the Russian Federation *has* systematically *exploited* existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies *as a political weapon* to harm the Union's economy. This *has led* to serious negative effects on Member States and the Union's economic security, *and also single market stability, the Union's consumers and competitiveness* in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

(3) In January 2006, ***the Russian Federation*** stopped its natural gas supplies to ***some*** countries in South East ***and Central*** Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices █ and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, ***the Russian Federation*** again fully cut off gas transiting through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, ***in particular*** those in Central and Eastern Europe. ***This*** supply disruption led to serious disturbances of gas markets in the region and ***in*** the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing lasting shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, and requiring them to declare the state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, ***seized*** Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced ***that they would*** supply Ukraine with gas, ***which led*** to market disturbances and price increases and ***harmed*** economic security. In the past, ***the Russian Federation***'s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been the subject ***of*** several Commission investigations for a possible breach of ***Union*** competition rules and has subsequently ***changed*** its conduct on the market ***in order*** to address the Commission's competition concerns. ***In several cases***, the competition issues at stake concerned █ so-called 'territorial restrictions' in Gazprom's gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the ***destination*** country █, as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions from participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets.

(4) ***The Russian Federation***'s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the clear potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union's economy and its essential security interests, as well as *of* direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens' health or life. Evidence shows that the State-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union's energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at *unprecedentedly low levels*, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs [REDACTED] and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, *which affected* short-term markets and *aggravated* the already tight supply situation after ***the Russian Federation***'s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, ***the Russian Federation*** systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances on the Union gas market. This affected *in particular* supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, [REDACTED] supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut *down* supplies via the pipeline entirely.

(5) ***The Russian Federation***'s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union's gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

(6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices **and volatility**, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, leading to risks **to** social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very **serious** problems **concerning** the security of energy supply in the Union and forced **11** Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁵. Benefiting from the Union's dependency during that crisis, **the Russian Federation**'s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from **the** remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports **still** accounting for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

⁵ Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj>).

(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to *preserving* market stability *and protecting* human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, *including* not least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from ***the Russian Federation*** would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore *decrease, rather than* increase, *its* security *of energy supply*. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by ***the Russian Federation***, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if *only* temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, *in particular* in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from ***the Russian Federation***. *In view of* the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, *as well as of* the fact that the government *of the Russian Federation* has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy *goals rather than* trade goals, it is appropriate to take *legally binding* measures to *eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities* of the Union resulting from natural gas imports *from the Russian Federation*, both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) .

(8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in *Article 3* of this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and *in particular* since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, **to not** accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods **from** the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken **at the** time of the **ongoing** emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

(9) Diversifying *the* LNG import [] is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. *To avoid any risk that long-term reservations of LNG terminal capacity held by Russian companies [] could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices, such as practices to book liquification or storage capacities without actually using them or with the purpose to prevent competitors from using the infrastructure, national regulators and competition authorities are to make full use of the robust legal instruments which are available under national and European energy and competition law where appropriate. In case customs authorities identify risks for safety or security resulting from Russian gas before entering the Union customs territory, they should make use of the provisions concerning risk management in the Union Customs Code to avoid such risks.*

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of [] imports of *Russian* natural gas []. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total *phase-out* of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022 [], and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the *phase-out* of Russian gas. The Commission's analysis showed that a *phase-out* of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner *and* in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the [] security of *the Union's energy* supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the *REPowerEU* Roadmap, the implementation of the *REPowerEU* Plan has already reduced *the Union's* dependencies *on supplies from the Russian Federation*, for instance by *introducing* measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as *by actively supporting the* diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the [] bargaining power *of the Union* via joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of *Impacts* also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies [].

(11) The proposed Regulation is fully compatible with the Union's strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil *fuel* imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the *REPowerEU* Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in substantial gas savings of more than 60 billion cubic *metres* annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce **█** dependencies *on supplies from the Russian Federation*. *This reduction of dependencies* could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, *to increase energy efficiency*, or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which *would* significantly *increase* the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the **█** bargaining power *of the Union* via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, *in particular* investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 *billion cubic metres* of natural gas by 2030. *These combined efforts will strengthen the Union's resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens and facilitate the phase-out* of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

(12) *While preparing the diversification plans, the Commission should, in a coordinated manner and in spirit of solidarity, work with Member States, in particular in Central and South-Eastern Europe, to identify alternative deliveries of natural gas. In addition to improving the security of supply, new supplies could also compensate for lost revenues through utilising the existing infrastructure that has been previously used for transporting Russian gas.*

(13) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from **the Russian Federation**. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can [] be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for **the** security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure [] . ***The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union.***

(14) *In some cases, LNG cargoes carry gas produced in different countries and mixed together. The prohibition should also apply to the amounts of gas in such cargoes that are produced in Russia. Where importers can unambiguously document the respective shares of LNG produced outside Russia, it should be possible to import the non-Russian LNG amounts contained in an LNG cargo.*

(15) Short-term *supply* contracts [concern smaller volumes than the large *long-term* supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies. *Those* existing *short-term supply* contracts will in any event be close to expiration *by the time* this Regulation *enters* into force. Accordingly, the risk *to* economic security resulting from existing *short-term supply contracts* appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term *supply* contracts from the immediate application of the import *prohibition* allowing for a transition phase until *25 April 2026 for LNG imports, taking into account Article 3ra of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council*⁶, and *until 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas.*

⁶ *Regulation No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229 31.7.2014, p. 1; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oi>).*

(16) An exemption from the prohibition **on** gas imports [] should also be granted for existing **long-term** supply contracts. [] Importers holding long-term **supply** contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also **because long-term supply** contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term **supply** contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term **supply** contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. *While LNG can be sourced world-wide and LNG customers usually face no physical barriers in switching to alternative suppliers on the LNG world-market, diversification for pipelines gas customers, notably in countries without LNG infrastructure, may be more complex. A longer transition time should therefore be granted for gas supplies under existing long-term pipeline contracts.*

(17) ***Specific situations have occurred where a country which is currently still supplied under existing long-term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas is specifically affected by recent changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, removing the possibility to import gas via the previous supply route,*** due to limited or no alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas to *it*. To remedy the situation, suppliers from other Member States currently ensure the delivery of pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific situation, the transition time necessary to find new suppliers should also apply to those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which serve to supply landlock countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian gas.

(18) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application *of the prohibition on imports of Russian gas*, not all contracts *concluded* before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such *an* exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive *for* Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of *the Commission* proposal *of this Regulation and* the entry into force of the *prohibition* to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from *the Russian Federation* decrease, *rather than increase*, as a result of *this prohibition, this* Regulation *should* avoid *incentives for companies to conclude* new Russian gas *import contracts* in the time between the *publication of the Commission* proposal *of this Regulation* and the entry into force of the *prohibition*. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State *or Government* to phase out *Russian* gas supplies was already made in March 2022; *the Commission built on this commitment by proposing* the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it *was* no longer appropriate *to* consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing *short-term* and long-term *supply* contracts.

(19) In order to avoid import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts *from being* increased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period. *Exceptions should be provided for certain cases of necessary amendments to existing contracts, provided they do not increase contracted quantities or the timing of delivery. Price variations resulting from price indexation already provided for in existing supply contracts do not constitute an amendment to existing supply contracts.*

(20) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition *on importing* Russian natural gas, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers and rendering the performance of natural gas imports from *the Russian Federation* unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

(21) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or *via* transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to *avoid circumvention of the prohibition*.

Relevant authorities should therefore be enabled to take the necessary actions to identify whether natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation are brought into the Union customs territory through schemes created for circumventing the rules of this Regulation. When determining whether natural gas is released for free circulation in the Union, customs authorities should not only depend on information provided in the customs declaration, but be allowed, on the basis of other relevant information, to assess, where they deem relevant, whether a good brought into the Union is actually meant to be released into free circulation. The Regulation should also require the establishment of the country of production and the supply chain of natural gas imported into the Union.

(22) In particular, importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide **█** authorities with all information necessary to establish the *country of production* of natural gas imported into the Union and to *determine* whether the imported gas *is subject to* the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. *The concept of 'origin' under Union customs law may not always allow for the identification of the country of production of the imported gas, for example when the gas was processed (e.g. liquified or regasified) after leaving the Russian Federation.* The Regulation should *therefore also cover cases where the country of 'origin' under Union custom law differs from the country of production of the gas and provide for a mechanism to verify whether the natural gas was extracted or liquified in the Russian Federation. Any gas which, before its import into the EU, was exported from the Russian Federation, either via direct export from Russia to the EU or via indirect export through a third country, should, except in case of transit, be subject to the prohibition.*

(23) *Due to the specific characteristics of pipeline gas and LNG, and in order to allow for a smooth verification process of the country of production and the conditions for possible exemptions before the gas enters the Union customs territory, a prior authorisation process should be introduced. Imports should be refused in the absence of an authorisation. Authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, should be informed in advance about intended imports into the Union, and the information should be submitted to them which is necessary to verify the country of production or whether the conditions for an exemption under this Regulation are met. While authorising authorities should strive to issue an authorisation within the period between submission of information by the importer and the planned entry into the customs territory in order to facilitate imports of gas to the EU, they may also decide at a later stage, in particular, in case there are doubts concerning the information provided. The prior authorisation is without prejudice to existing enforcement powers of customs authorities. Imports of natural gas from gas producing countries should be exempted from that obligation if the Union has imported significant volumes from these countries in the past and if these countries either have shown that they do not want to support the Russian gas sector by a prohibition of the import of Russian gas, restrictive measures targeting Russian gas infrastructure, Russian gas companies or persons managing such companies, or if these countries do not dispose of the necessary infrastructure to import natural gas via pipelines or LNG. The Commission should establish the list of such countries.*

(24) *Authorising authorities and, where they are not identical, customs authorities should be able to request all information necessary to assess the legality of imports. They should also be able to rely on information from other sources. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment are often complex, the authorities should be empowered to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, where that is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. This Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.*

(25) *In exercising their powers, authorising authorities and customs authorities should put a particular focus of their enforcement at interconnection points, LNG facilities or transit pipelines where the risk of circumvention is high. Practices of using so-called “shadow fleets” for the circumvention of the sanctions have been observed in oil transport, and they could also pose risks for LNG imports, undermining the objectives of this Regulation. In close cooperation with each other, authorities should adapt their enforcement priorities where necessary to address potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also constantly monitor the flows of Russian natural gas transiting through third countries.*

(26) *Some of the Russian gas transmission infrastructure is directly connected to the Union, and some transit pipelines connecting Russia with the Union are running through third countries without currently having any entry points between the Russian Federation and the Union. The Regulation should therefore presume that natural gas imported into the Union via borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union, Belarus and the Union or arriving via pipelines such as TurkStream at the interconnection point Strandzha 2 / Malkoclar originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, thus replacing the requirement to submit proof of the country of production. In case it is claimed that natural gas arriving at these borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points is under a ‘transit’ procedure through the Russian Federation, strict controls should apply. The Russian Federation is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as a gas transit country in the past, due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in the Russian Federation via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, and the Russian Federation’s geographical location [REDACTED]. Therefore, and taking into account incentives of Russian suppliers to circumvent the import prohibition, customs authorities should refuse the import of volumes of natural gas allegedly in transit unless unequivocal evidence can be provided which proves that the gas has been in transit through the Russian Federation and that it was produced in a country other than the Russian Federation. The necessary evidence should be provided to the authorising authorities sufficiently in advance, that is no later than one month before the entry into the customs territory, to allow for the traceability of the imported gas up to the place of production.*

(27) *The interconnection point Strandzha 1 connects the Union to a pipeline system which transports not only gas from Azerbaijan or Türkiye, but also significant volumes of gas from the Russian Federation. Unambiguous evidence to establish the non-Russian country of production should therefore be required, and sufficient verification time should be granted to authorities to ensure that gas imported via Strandzha 1 does not originate in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. In case other interconnector points should be linked to systems transporting significant volumes of Russian gas in future, the same standard of control should apply.*

(28) *Furthermore, significant volumes of natural gas may also enter the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure. As the strict monitoring rules for gas imports such as the prior authorisation do not apply to gas crossing the Union or being stored under customs warehousing rules under a ‘transit’ procedure, it is appropriate to provide for specific safeguards in the form of a transit monitoring regime, which enables customs to effectively monitor gas flows under a ‘transit’ procedure, to ensure that natural gas which crosses the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure is not ultimately entering into free circulation in the Union. In case third country operators store gas under a transit, temporary storage or customs warehousing procedure under the Union Customs Code, Member States should have appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that the use of domestic storage by third countries does not pose any risk to national or regional security of supply and the fulfilment of storage obligations, and provide relevant information to the Commission.*

(29) *In line with the principle of sincere cooperation, authorising authorities, customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Commission should cooperate to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, in particular regarding the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after the entry into force of this Regulation. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure, where necessary, that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities to make use of the budget available under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should update regulatory authorities, the competent authorities and the Commission on a monthly basis on the key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas, such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term supply contracts, entry points, or contract partners. The Commission should include this information, where relevant, in the report on the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also assess the effectiveness of the exchange of information and cooperation among the relevant authorities, and where appropriate, set out recommendations for their improvement in that report.*

(30) *The* experience with the ***phase-out of Russian*** gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full ***phase-out*** of Russian gas in a coordinated manner, and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk ***to the*** security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans ***should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the respective Member State.*** They should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as possible technical, ***contractual*** or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

(31) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of *State or Government* committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from *the Russian Federation*, but also other energy supplies, *in particular* oil supplies. *The Russian Federation has applied similar practices as in the field of gas, where Russia has a history of using gas as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation, also when trading oil with the Union. This has been evidenced, for example, by past interruptions of oil supplies. Existing oil supply relations with the Russian Federation create dependencies and risks for security in the Union. In order to prevent Russia from using the Union's oil imports as a tool for coercion, it is therefore essential to prepare a timely phase out also of oil imports from the Russian Federation.* While restrictive measures to ensure the *phase-out* of oil imports from *the Russian Federation* are already in place [] and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further *phase-out* of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. []

(32) *Member States should therefore also prepare national diversification plans for crude oil and petroleum products which should include measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency and traceability of oil imports from the Russian Federation. The Commission should provide recommendations on those plans. Those plans should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the respective Member State. The Commission should, in parallel, continue addressing the problem of circumvention of EU oil sanctions by using so-called “shadow fleets”, in particular by pursuing the actions set out in its Communication “Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports” of 6 May 2025.*

(33) ***The*** experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 **█** showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial **for monitoring** gas supply in the Union. Therefore, importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions **set out** in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information **█** necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even **█** text parts ***in full***, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where **that** is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

(34) Member States and **the** Union should cooperate closely **on** the implementation of this Regulation **█**, including *in relation to possible dispute settlement procedures. Where applicable, Regulations (EU) 1219/2012⁷ and (EU) 912/2014⁸ of the European Parliament and of the Council set out further details on cooperation and allocation of financial responsibilities between the Member States and the Union* concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement cases *related to this* Regulation.

(35) *In view of the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change and impede agreed court and arbitration procedures, neither affected persons, nor the Union and Member States can be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under illegal procedures against which no remedies are effectively accessible under the relevant jurisdiction.*

⁷ Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries (OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 40, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1219/oi>).

⁸ Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 121, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/912/oi>).

(36) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure *the* security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations *for* Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with *the Russian Federation* at Union, regional and Member State level. In case of sudden and significant developments, which seriously threaten the security of supply of one or more Member States, *and after an emergency in accordance with Article 11 or 12 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 has been declared*, it is appropriate to empower the Commission to take the necessary emergency measures by *adopting the decision regarding* the import prohibitions concerning natural gas or LNG imports set out in this Regulation *in one or more Member States. The Commission should, in such a situation, also be able to suspend the obligation to submit proof of the country of production prior to the entry into the Union's customs territory, in order to facilitate additional imports on short notice. Such a decision by the Commission* should be limited in time and *not be granted for more than 4 weeks and renewed only if the conditions for the emergency pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 still apply*. The Commission implementing decision *should* impose certain additional conditions, to ensure that any *such* suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat. The Commission should *inform the Gas Coordination Group and shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council justifying the suspension and any extension, and should* closely monitor the application of any such temporary *suspension*.

(37) *To avoid “penalty shopping” and to ensure consistent application of this Regulation, Member States should lay down harmonised rules on penalties for infringements of this Regulation. However, since infringements of this Regulation could also infringe other Union legislation closely linked to the prohibitions and obligations in this Regulation, such as customs legislation, restrictive measures or Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the imposition of penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of *ne bis in idem*, in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisprudence of the right as interpreted by the Court of Justice. This Regulation is without prejudice to the imposition of criminal penalties under national law.*

(38) The [] measures *introduced with this Regulation* fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. [] This Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the *phase-out* of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

(39) Since the objectives of this Regulation relating to the monitoring of possible gas dependencies cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can be better and more efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(40) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. *Market participants had significant time to adapt their supply portfolio after the Versailles Declaration of March 2022 and the adoption of the proposal for this Regulation on 17 June 2025. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate to provide for a transition period to allow gas suppliers which have not yet adapted their supply strategies to make the necessary arrangements to comply with this Regulation. The prohibition to import gas from the Russian Federation should therefore only apply as of [6 weeks after entry into force of this Regulation]. In order to allow importers with existing supply contracts and importers concluding new contracts to carry out the necessary prior authorisation in a timely manner and without disruptions for planned gas imports, the different authorisation processes provided for in this Regulation should already apply before the prohibition of imports of gas from the Russian Federation becomes applicable.*

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation provides a framework for effectively *eliminating* the Union's *remaining* exposure to the significant risks for trade and security *of supply*, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation *and preparing the effective and timely phasing out of oil imports from the Russian Federation* by laying down:

- (a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation;
- (b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the *phase-out* of oil imports from *the Russian Federation*;
- (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

- (1) 'natural gas' means **gas** as referred to in Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 2711 11 00 and 2711 21 00;
- (2) 'LNG' means liquefied natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 11 00;
- (3) 'natural gas in gaseous state' means natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 21 00;
- (4) '***mixtures***' means ***mixtures of LNG volumes from different countries of origin***;
- (5) 'long-term supply contract' means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, exceeding one year;
- (6) 'short-term supply contract' means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, not exceeding one year;

(7) ‘landlocked country’ means a country that is entirely surrounded by land and has **no** direct access to the sea;

(8) ‘*import*’ means *the placing of goods under release for free circulation, as referred to in Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council*⁹;

(9) ‘importer’ means *the natural or legal person that is the declarant in the relevant customs declaration as defined in Article 5, point (15), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, or otherwise* a natural or legal person, *including affiliated undertakings, that brings the goods* into the **Union** customs territory or otherwise placed on the Union market;

(10) ‘*affiliated undertaking*’ means *an undertaking as defined in Article 2, point (12), of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council*¹⁰;

⁹ *Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (recast) (OJ L 269 10.10.2013, p. 1; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oi>)*

¹⁰ *Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/34/oi>).*

(11) ‘customs authority’ means a customs authority as defined in Article 5, point (1), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;

(12) ***‘authorising authority’ means the authority which is competent to examine the authorisation requests made pursuant to Article 5(1) and (2);***

(13) ‘competent authority’ means a competent authority as defined in Article 2, point (7), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹¹;

(14) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated ***pursuant to*** Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹²;

(15) ‘control’ means control as defined in Article 2, point (55), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

¹¹ Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj>).

¹² *Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast) (OJ L, 2024/1788, 15.7.2024; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oi>)*

(16) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2, point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(17) ‘*interconnector*’ means an *interconnector as defined in Article 2, point (39), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788*;

(18) ‘entry point’ means an entry point as defined in Article 2, point (61), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(19) ‘*delivery point*’ means the physical or virtual location specified in a gas supply contract at which natural gas is to be delivered by a seller and received by a buyer;

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(20) 'contracted quantities' means the quantities of natural gas that *a buyer* is obligated to purchase and *a seller* is obligated to provide, as specified in the *original* supply contract, *but* excluding volumes arising from *contractual provisions providing for quantity changes to baseline* quantities, *such as round-up quantities, fractional quantities, upward quantities* or other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract *except for paid make-up* quantities *paid before 17 June 2025*;

(21) '*round-up quantities*' means *volumes of natural gas added to the annual contracted quantity in a given year to provide for the last cargo to be rounded-up to a whole cargo*;

(22) '*fractional quantities*' means *volumes of natural gas carried forward to following contract years if the quantity delivered during a year is more or less than the adjusted annual contracted quantity after adjustments; these volumes can be both positive and negative*;

(23) '*upward quantities*' means volumes of natural gas to be added optionally to the annual contracted quantity based on supply contracts at the discretion of a contract party;

(24) '*paid* make-up quantities' mean the volumes of natural gas which a *buyer* is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract;

(25) 'delivery schedule' means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of gas to be delivered by *a seller* and received by *a buyer* over defined time intervals, including the timing, location, and conditions of delivery, as set *out* in a supply contract or any related operational procedures;

(26) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹³;

(27) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas *condensates*, refinery feedstocks, additives and oxygenates, and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes 2709 and 2710.

(28) *‘country of production’ means the country where the natural gas is extracted, regardless of whether that natural gas has been subsequently liquified or re-gasified in another country. Where natural gas extracted in other countries than the Russian Federation is liquified or re-gasified in the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation shall be considered to be the country of production;*

¹³ Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (OJ L, 2024/1789, 15.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1789/oj>).

CHAPTER II

STEPWISE **PROHIBITION** OF NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 3

Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation

1. The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited [REDACTED] unless one of the *exemptions provided for* in Article 4 applies.
2. The import of LNG, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, *from the Russian Federation, or which is obtained from natural gas in gaseous state extracted in* the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited [REDACTED], unless one of the *exemptions provided for* in Article 4 applies. *This prohibition shall also apply to LNG which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation contained in mixtures.*

Article 4

Transition phase for existing supply contracts

1. *The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply as of 17 June 2026, and the prohibition pursuant Article 3 paragraph 2 shall apply as of 25 April 2026, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that the respective imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract, concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.*
2. *Article 3 paragraph 2 shall apply as of 1 January 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.*

3. *The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply as of 30 September 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.*

Where the Commission identifies a risk that the filling target for 2027 for underground storage of a Member State pursuant to Art 6a of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 might not be reached, taking into account the circumstances for the risk of missing the target, it shall confirm this risk by way of an implementing decision no later than 15 September 2027.

In case an implementing decision is taken pursuant to subparagraph 2, the prohibition for existing contracts pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply only as of 1 November 2027 in that Member State. The Commission shall inform, without any delay, the Gas Coordination Group, the European Parliament and the Council.

4. *The exemptions provided for in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 shall also apply with regard to existing supply contracts with the following amendments:*

- (a) lowering contracted quantities;*
- (b) lowering prices and fees;*
- (c) amending confidentiality clauses;*
- (d) amending operational procedures, such as communication procedures;*
- (e) changes of addresses of contract parties;*
- (f) transfers of contractual obligations between affiliated undertakings;*
- (g) changes required by judicial or arbitration procedures; or*
- (h) for landlocked countries, changes between national delivery points.*

5. *The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 shall apply as of 30 September 2027 or, where the Commission has adopted an implementing decision in accordance with subparagraph 2 of paragraph 3, as of 1 November 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities:*

- (a) *that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract with delivery to a landlocked country which is necessary to fulfil the long-term supply contract under point (b), and,*
- (b) *that a long-term supply contract, with delivery to a landlocked country for the import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines exists:*
 - (i) *which was concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4,*

- (ii) *and which concerns gas supplies which originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and*
 - (iii) *for which the delivery at the original delivery point at an EU border with a third country can no longer be executed.*

6. *Authorising authorities or customs authorities, where they are not identical, shall provide relevant information to the Commission allowing it to monitor if the specific conditions described in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 continue to be fulfilled. In doing so, the Commission shall in particular monitor whether this provision is not used for circumvention.*

7. The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 *and* 3 shall not exceed the contracted quantities.

CHAPTER III

AUTHORISATION, SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Article 5

Authorisation and submission of relevant information

1. *Where an exemption is requested for imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation pursuant to Article 4, imports shall be subject to prior authorisation. Authorising authorities shall be provided with all information necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 4 are met.*

2. **That** information [] shall include at least [] the following:

- (a) the date of the conclusion of the gas supply contract;
- (b) the duration of the gas supply contract;
- (c) the contracted [] quantities, including all upward or downward flexibility rights;
- (d) the identity of the parties to the gas supply contract, including, for parties registered in the EU, the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number;
- []
- (e) *in the case of LNG mixtures, documentation proving the respective quantities of Russian and non-Russian gas in the mixture and establishing the mixing process;*
- (f) for LNG imports, *the place of liquefaction and* the port of first loading;

- (g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning the delivery point; **and**
- (h) any **amendment** of the gas supply contract, indicating **the** content and **the** date of the **amendment**, with the exception of **amendments** which relate solely to the gas price.

Where an exemption under Article 4 is requested and the price of the gas was amended on 17 June 2025 or later, information on the price amendment shall be provided.

The required information shall be submitted to the authorising authority no later than one month before the entry into the customs territory. The same deadline shall apply to mixtures containing gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.

3. *Imports of natural gas where the country of production is not the Russian Federation shall be subject to prior authorisation, except in case those imports fall under paragraph 5. The authorising authorities in the Member State where the gas is to be released for free circulation shall be provided with evidence establishing the country of production of that natural gas, no later than 5 working days before its entry into the customs territory.*

4. *No prior authorisation shall be required where gas is imported from a country which produces gas and has exported more than 5 bcm of natural gas to the Union in 2024 and has either prohibited the import of Russian gas or is applying other restrictive measures concerning Russian gas, or has no gas infrastructure in place which allows to import LNG or pipeline gas. No later than 5 working days after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall, by means of an implementing decision, draw up the list of such countries. The Commission shall monitor whether the criteria for an exemption from prior authorisation remain fulfilled and shall update the list accordingly and without undue delay on the basis of the information provided by authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, and by Union bodies pursuant to Article 7(2).*

The Commission may, by means of an implementing decision, revoke the exemption from prior authorisation if authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, identify one or more cases of circumvention of the prohibitions set out in Article 3 by exporters from an exempted country or if the Commission has reasons to assume that authorities from exporting countries do not intervene appropriately against practices of circumvention.

The report pursuant to Article 13 shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of the prior authorisation process pursuant to Article 5(2).

5. *Authorising authorities*, customs authorities, *where they are not identical* or other authorities involved in the monitoring *referred to in* Article 6 and 7 may request more detailed information, *if that* information is *deemed* necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in *Articles* 3 and 4 are fulfilled. *They may also rely on information from other sources. Authorising authorities* may, in particular, require *submitting* the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the *entire* text of *the* gas supply contract, except price information, *in particular* where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for *that* assessment. *Where the information* provided is not conclusive, *the customs authorities shall* refuse the release for free circulation of the goods. *The Commission, shall, in close cooperation with authorising authorities, or custom authorities, where they are not identical, publish guidance on further details concerning the prior authorisation process and adequate types of documents and evidence to be submitted.*

6. *Authorising authorities or, where relevant, customs authorities shall, where appropriate, verify the evidence submitted to establish the country of production by providing further information, which may include but not be limited to upstream delivery documentation, such as publicly available satellite tracking of LNG cargoes or tracking information from the European Maritime Safety Agency.*
7. Natural gas █ to be imported into the Union through *borders or interconnectors or* interconnection points *between the Union and the Russian Federation or Belarus, or via pipelines which connect the Russian Federation with the Union and are running through third countries without having entry points between the Russian Federation and the Union* shall be presumed to be exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation █ .

8. *Natural gas to be imported into the Union via Strandzha 1 shall be presumed to be exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, unless unambiguous evidence can be provided to the authorising authorities, no later than 7 working days before the entry into the customs territory, establishing that the country of production of the natural gas is not the Russian Federation.*
9. *In case changes relating to gas infrastructure or trading patterns lead to a situation where other interconnector points link the Union to systems transporting significant volumes of Russian gas, the Commission shall identify those interconnector points by means of Commission implementing decision. In that case the time to submit unambiguous evidence for the country of production shall be 7 working days.*
10. *Where natural gas is transported through the EU from third country to third country under a transit procedure under the Union Customs Code, including for the purpose of storage under customs warehousing rules, the authorising and customs authorities, where they are not identical, shall be informed no later than 5 working days before the planned transit about:*
 - (a) *the country of production of the natural gas to be transiting, unless such information is not available;*

- (b) *the planned or actual nomination schedules specifying volume, timing, and entry and exit points of the gas in transit, with daily granularity where applicable;*
- (c) *volumes and delivery points in the gas supply contracts; and*
- (d) *the contract between the seller or buyer or any intermediary entity and the relevant Transmission System Operators in the Union, where applicable.*

Authorising authorities shall verify the consistency of the data and share the information received with customs authorities, where they are not the same, without delay.

11. *In case operators store Russian gas under a transit, temporary storage or customs warehousing procedure under the Union Customs Code on Union territory, Member States shall have appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that the use of domestic storage by third countries does not pose any risk to national or regional security of supply and the fulfilment of the storage obligations provided for in Articles 6a to 6d of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, and provide relevant information to the Commission. The Commission shall include information on possible security of supply issues related to Russian gas in Union storages in its annual report pursuant to Article 11(3).*

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Article 6
Effective monitoring and reporting

Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities, *the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)* and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II, *and when* necessary, *make* full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with *other* relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, *Union authorities and* the Commission. *Authorising authorities and, where relevant, customs authorities shall, where appropriate, verify the evidence submitted to establish the country of production by requiring further information, which may include but not be limited to upstream delivery documentation, such as publicly available satellite tracking of LNG cargoes or tracking information from the European Maritime Safety Agency.*

In exercising their powers, authorising authorities and customs authorities shall put a particular focus of their enforcement at interconnection points, LNG facilities or transit pipelines where the risk of circumvention is high, for instance in case imports arrive from third countries who also trade Russian gas or who export gas from production facilities which are partly owned by companies from the Russian Federation. Using the cooperation mechanism between authorities pursuant to Article 7 of this Regulation, authorities shall adapt their enforcement priorities where necessary to address potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, shall monitor the total volumes of natural gas imported through third countries in order to assess potential risks of circumvention of Articles 3 and 4.

Article 7

Cooperation and exchange of information

- 1. The authorising authority is the customs authority, unless the Member State designates another authority for that purpose. Member States shall inform the Commission in case they designate another authority than the customs authority as authorising authority.*

2. *Authorising authorities shall **cooperate and** exchange the information received **on imports of** natural gas [] with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, **and where applicable, customs authorities, as well as OLAF, EPPO, ACER and the Commission in line with their tasks, responsibilities and competences, and** to the extent **possible**, to ensure effective assessment **of** whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 **and** 4 of this Regulation are fulfilled. They shall **notably share** information **concerning potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation.***
3. *Authorising authorities or, where applicable, customs authorities, shall update regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission, on a monthly basis, on the key elements concerning the development of imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term supply contracts, entry points, or contract partners. These updates shall also cover key developments concerning Russian gas entering the Union under a transit procedure as referred to in Article 5(10).*

4 *Authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities, from different Member States, shall exchange, to the extent necessary, information received on natural gas imports and cooperate with one another in order to ensure efficient enforcement and avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing for the effective exchange of relevant information between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary. The report pursuant to Article 13 shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the exchange of information and cooperation among the relevant authorities pursuant paragraph 2 and 4 and Article 6, and, where appropriate, shall set out recommendations for their improvement.*

5. By **1 July** 2026 and **1 July** 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and **on** own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts **for** the supply of **natural gas, which originates** in or **is exported**, directly or indirectly, **from the Russian Federation**, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets. **Where relevant, the report shall also cover data on Russian gas entering the Union under a transit procedure as referred to in Article 5(10).**

6. The Commission and ACER shall, *where appropriate*, share relevant information in their possession *on contracts for the import of natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation with authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities* to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation.
7. *Where relevant for the fulfilment of the obligation under the first subparagraph of this paragraph, Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97¹⁴ shall apply mutatis mutandis.*

Article 8

Penalties

1. *Member States shall provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for failure to comply with Articles 3, 4 or 5 of this Regulation.*

¹⁴ *Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 082 22.3.1997, p. 1; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1997/515/oj>)*

2. *The maximum penalty for legal persons shall be at least:*

- *3,5% of the undertaking's total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, or*
- *40 million EUR, or*
- *300% of the estimated transaction turnover, which shall be calculated on the basis of the volume of the natural gas involved and the "day-ahead" contract prices on the TTF market.*

With regard to natural persons, the maximum penalty shall not be lower than 2,5 million EUR.

3. *Where the legal system of the Member State does not provide power for competent authorities to independently impose administrative fines, this Article may be applied in such a manner that the fining procedure is initiated by the competent authority and imposed by competent national courts, while ensuring that those legal remedies are effective and have an effect equivalent to the administrative fines imposed by supervisory authorities. In any event, the fines imposed shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.*
4. *Member States shall notify the Commission no later than 2 years from the entry into force of this Regulation of the national provisions in force, as envisaged in this Article, and shall also notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting those provisions.*

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION PLANS

Article 9

National diversification plans for natural gas

1. ***Each Member State*** shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to ***diversifying*** their gas supplies, ***in order*** to discontinue all imports of natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, within the deadline for the full prohibition of ***█ imports from the Russian Federation pursuant to Articles 3 and 4.***
2. The national diversification plan for natural gas shall include all ***of*** the following:
 - (a) available information on the volume of imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts;

(b) a clear description of *supporting* measures in place and *supporting measures* planned at national level to replace natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and *a timeline for* implementation and, *where* available, envisaged options for alternative supplies and supply routes. Such measures may include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article *42 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789*, support measures for diversification efforts of energy companies, cooperation in regional groups such as the CESEC High-Level Group, *the identification of* alternatives to natural gas imports via electrification, *energy sufficiency*, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment, voluntary demand reduction measures *or possibilities of other Member States to facilitate diversification of supply*;

(c) *the* identification of any potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to *replacing* natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall **submit to** the Commission their national diversification plans using the template set out in Annex I.
4. The Commission shall, ***where appropriate***, facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for natural gas, ***including by providing best practices and technical assistance. During the transition phase for existing supply contracts pursuant to Article 4, the Commission shall coordinate with Member States in their diversification efforts to identify alternative supply sources. New supplies could also compensate for lost revenues by using existing infrastructure previously utilised to transit Russian gas.***
Member States shall report regularly to the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those plans. On the basis of the national diversification plans, the Commission shall assess the implementation of the ***phase-out of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation*** and report it to the Gas Coordination Group, as per Article 11 of this Regulation.

Article 10

National diversification plans for oil (*crude oil and petroleum products*)

1. *A Member State that receives* imports of oil originating in or exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, **I** shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to *diversifying* their oil supplies, *in order* to discontinue, by *the end of 2027*, imports of oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.
2. *A* national diversification plan for oil shall include all *of* the following:
 - (a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil imports from *the Russian Federation* under existing supply contracts;
 - (b) measures planned at national level to replace oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and *a timeline for* implementation, and options for alternative supplies, supply routes *and energy sources, as well as possibilities of other Member States to facilitate diversification of supply*;

- (c) *measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency and traceability of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, to the extent possible, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports;*
- (d) *possible prohibitions at national level of imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.*
- (e) potential technical, *contractual* or regulatory barriers to *replacing oil*, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national diversification plans █ using the template set out in Annex II. *The Commission publishes a non-confidential version of the plans received from Member States no later than one month after the submission of the plans.*

4. The Commission shall, *where appropriate*, facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil, *including by providing best practices and technical assistance. The Commission shall assist in the cooperation between Member States when they implement the national diversification plans. The Commission shall assess the impact of a possible accelerated termination of oil imports on the Member States most affected by a full phase out of Russian oil supplies. It shall work actively with the directly affected and other relevant Member States on solutions to minimise possible risks identified in the assessment.* Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC¹⁵ on the progress achieved *on* the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans.

¹⁵ Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj>).

5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the **█** phasing out *of oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, by the end of 2027 might* not be achieved, the Commission *shall, after assessing the national diversification plan and within 3 months of the submission of the national diversification plan*, issue a recommendation **█** to the **█** Member State *concerned* on how to achieve the *phase-out* in a timely manner. *The Commission shall publish the recommendations no later than three months after the submission of the diversification plan.* Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission's recommendation.

CHAPTER V

MONITORING ■ SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY

Article 11

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 2, the following points (33) and (34) are added:

(33) ‘take-or-pay provision’ means a contractual provision which obliges the buyer to either take delivery of, or alternatively pay for a specified minimum quantity of gas within a given period, regardless of whether the gas is actually received;

(34) ‘deliver-or-pay provisions’ means a contractual provision which obliges the seller to pay a contractual fine in *the* case of non-delivery of gas.;

(2) Article 14(6) is amended as follows:

(a) in the first subparagraph, the following point (c) is added:

‘(c) to the Commission and to the **█** competent **authorities concerned** the following information relating to supply contracts for natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation:

- (i) the information referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) .../... *+;
- (ii) information on **the** quantities to be supplied and taken, including possible flexibilities undertake-or-pay provisions or deliver-or-pay provisions;
- (iii) delivery schedules (LNG) or nominations (pipeline gas);
- (iv) possible contractual flexibilities concerning the annual contracted quantities, including make-up quantities;

⁺ OJ: Please insert in the text the number of this Regulation and complete the corresponding footnote.

- (v) conditions for the suspension or termination of gas deliveries, including force majeure provisions;
- (vi) information on which law **governs** the contract and which arbitration mechanism is chosen;
- (vii) key elements of other commercial agreements that are relevant for the execution of the gas supply contract, excluding price information.;

* Regulation (EU) .../... of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase out of oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (OJ ..., ELI: ...).'

- (b) the following **subparagraph is** added:

‘The information referred to in point (c) shall be provided **no later than 4 weeks after the entry into force of Regulation (EU)/....** ⁺ **and** for each contract in a disaggregated format, including the █ relevant text parts **in full**, excluding price information, **in particular** where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the **assessment of the** security of **gas supply** █ or where certain contractual provisions are interrelated.

⁺ OJ please insert in the text the number of this Regulation.

Providers of LNG terminal services shall provide the Commission with information concerning services booked by customers from the Russian Federation,’ customers controlled by undertakings from the Russian Federation, including contracted services, affected quantities and contract duration.;’

(3) in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall ***continuously monitor the*** exposure of the Union’s energy system to supplies, ***also via third countries, of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation in particular*** on the basis of information notified to ***the Commission and the*** competent authorities ***in accordance with*** Article 14(6), point (c).

The Commission shall assess the implementation of the ***phase-out of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation under*** Regulation (EU) .../...* at national, regional and Union level on the basis of the national diversification plans ***referred to in*** Article 9 of that Regulation. This assessment shall be reported to the Gas Coordination Group.

On the basis [] of the assessment referred to in the third paragraph, the Commission shall publish an annual report, which shall provide a comprehensive overview of the progress achieved by Member States in implementing their national diversification plans.

Where relevant, the [] Commission ***may issue, within three months of notification of a diversification plan, a*** recommendation which identifies possible actions and measures to ensure ***a secure [] diversification of gas supply and a timely phase-out of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.***

The Member States concerned shall update their national diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission's recommendation.

* Regulation (EU) .../... of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase out of oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (OJ ..., ELI: ...).⁷

CHAPTER VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 12

Professional secrecy

1. Any confidential information received, exchanged, or transmitted *in accordance with* this Regulation shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in this Article.
2. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have worked for authorities involved in the implementation of this Regulation *and to* any natural or legal person to whom the relevant authorities have delegated *their* powers, including auditors and experts contracted by *these* authorities.

3. Information covered by professional secrecy shall not be disclosed to any other person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law.
4. All information exchanged between the relevant authorities *or Member States* under this Regulation that concerns business *conditions* or operational conditions *or* other economic or personal affairs shall be considered confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy, except where the *relevant* authority states at the time of *the* communication that such information may be disclosed, *is required by virtue of Union or national law* or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.

Article 13
Monitoring

The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union's energy market, *in particular* with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other *risks to the* security of *energy supply* in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. *By [two years after entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall submit a report on the implementation of this Regulation to the European Parliament and the Council.*

In the case of sudden and significant developments, seriously threatening the security of energy supply of one or more Member States, and after an emergency in accordance with Article 11 or 12 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 has been declared, the Commission may temporarily suspend the application of Chapter II of this Regulation in one or more Member States, in whole or in part. The Commission may, in such a situation, also suspend the requirement of prior authorisation pursuant to Article 5(2). The Commission's decision shall contain certain conditions, in particular to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat. The suspension shall be limited to a duration which is strictly necessary to bridge the time until there are sufficient supplies from other countries than the Russian Federation to meet Union demand. It shall not be granted for more than 4 weeks and shall only be renewed if the conditions for the emergency pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 still apply. Only short-term supply contracts shall be allowed under a temporary suspension pursuant to this paragraph. The Commission shall inform the Member States and the Gas Coordination Group of any suspensions, and shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council justifying the suspension and any extension. The Commission shall present the report to Parliament if invited to do so.

Article 14

Entry into force and application

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 3 shall apply from [6 weeks after entry into force of this Regulation], except where otherwise specified in Article 4.

Article 5 shall apply from [6 weeks minus one month after the entry into force of this Regulation].

This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of the prohibition related to LNG established in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹⁶ which shall apply and be complied with regardless of the provisions of this Regulation.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at ...,

For the European Parliament

The President

For the Council

The President

¹⁶ *Regulation No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229 31.7.2014, p. 1; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oi>).*

ANNEX I

Template for national diversification plans for natural gas

This template is designed for national authorities drafting a national diversification plan as provided for in Article 9. It shall include the following:

General information

Name of the authority responsible for the preparation of the plan	
Description of the gas system. It should include a description of: (i) the gas demand; (ii) the supply mix considering the dependence on Russian supply.	

Main information about the import of gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation to the Member State

Reference of the individual contracts as communicated by the importers to the competent authorities and the Commission.	
<i>Where applicable</i> , LNG terminal services booked by companies <i>or affiliated undertakings</i> from the Russian Federation	
Overall contracted quantities of █ gas <i>which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation</i> for delivery in the Member State. Include contractual flexibilities and point of delivery (interconnection point, import point, LNG terminal, etc).	

Description of the measures to replace natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

3.1. The description shall include the following elements:

Diversification options: (i) alternative supplies; (ii) alternative supply routes; (iii) demand aggregation.	
Description of the measure and its objectives, including quantities expected to be phased out and intermediate steps in case of a multi-stage measure.	
Implementation timeline	
Impact of the measures to the energy system, including on flow patterns, infrastructure capacities, tariffs, etc.	
Impact on neighbouring Member States.	

Technical, **contractual** or regulatory barriers to replace gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Technical, contractual or regulatory barriers	
Options to overcome barriers and timeline	
Category	Replacement of volumes for the phase out ¹⁷
Information required	Description of measures in place and planned at national level to replace the remaining volumes of natural gas originated in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation (i) quantities expected to be phased out by each measure, (ii) implementation timeline (start-end), (iii) options for alternative supplies and supply routes
Pipeline gas	
LNG	

¹⁷ Such measures may include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article 42 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, **support** measures for diversification efforts of energy companies, cooperation in regional groups such as the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) High-Level Group, identifying alternatives to natural gas imports via electrification, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment or voluntary demand reduction measures.

ANNEX II

Template for national diversification plans for oil

This template is designed for national authorities drafting a detailed national diversification plan as provided for in Article 10. It shall include:

General information

Name of the authority responsible for the preparation of the plan	
Description of the oil system. It should include a description of: (i) the oil demand; (ii) the supply mix considering the dependence on Russian supply.	

Main information about the import of oil (*crude oil and petroleum products*) which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation to the Member State

Overall contracted quantities of Russian oil for delivery in the Member State. Include expiry date of contractual obligations.	
Information about the identity of the different stakeholders (seller, importer, and buyer).	

Description of the measures to replace oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

The description shall include the following elements:

Diversification options: (i) alternative supplies; (ii) alternative supply routes.	
Description of the measure and its objectives, including quantities expected to be phased out and intermediate steps in case of a multi-stage measure. <i>Measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency, traceability of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, to the extent possible, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports.</i>	
Implementation timeline	
Impact of measures to the energy system, including on flow patterns, infrastructure capacities, tariffs, etc.	
Impact on neighbouring Member States.	

Technical, ***contractual*** or regulatory barriers to replace oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Technical █ , <i>contractual</i> or regulatory barriers	
Options to overcome █ barrier and timeline	
